Train operations
Enhancing the safety of train operations to reduce train accident risks.
Rail is one of the safest ways to travel, but the continued occurrence of signals passed at danger (SPADs), derailments and buffer stop collisions shows that it is important to monitor the precursors and trends to ensure this safe state remains.
Fourteen potentially high-risk train accidents were recorded in 2022/23, of which four were collisions between trains. This includes the SPAD and collision at Loversall Carr Junction, which RAIB is investigating. There were also three potentially high-risk derailments, although this is the lowest number seen over the last five years.
The number of SPADs has been on an upward trend over the past two years. A high number over the summer prompted RSSB to undertake a deep-dive into the potential causes. More widely, the number of SPADs and SPAD risk has not materially improved over the last 10 years (see chart overleaf).
RSSB has developed the SPAD toolbox to increase SPAD awareness and help train drivers easily find the information they need to reduce SPADs. RSSB’s Red Aspect Approaches to Signals (RAATS) toolkit, meanwhile, estimates the number of times a signal is approached at red.
Overspeeding incidents also continue to occur as exemplified by the overspeeding incident at Peterborough station last year, which RAIB is investigating. The continued occurrence of SPADs and overspeeding raise an important question for train protection systems. Put simply: where next? Concepts such as Optimised Train Track Operations (OTTO) would provide greater controls against SPADs and overspeeding while also providing a path to full European Train Control System (ETCS).
We have completed an independent review of the preliminary safety analysis for OTTO for Network Rail and will continue to monitor events like SPADs and overspeeding to understand the causes behind them. But this is only possible with good data quality. Without thorough and robust investigations that get to the underlying causes of an incident, we cannot fully understand how we can prevent them from occurring in the future.
Objects on the line continues to be a concern, demonstrated by the collision between a train and hand trolley at Challow in 2021 (the RAIB investigation was published in 2022). RSSB is supporting the industry by improving the understanding of this risk to help prioritise those objects that pose the greatest risk in terms of derailment, damage and injuries.
A reporter raised concerns about the posting of late notices for drivers. The process did not adequately capture notices that were submitted outside of the typical working day.
The train operator responded that tablet computers for drivers were being rolled out. This would allow late notices to be distributed directly to drivers.