<p>RSSB's <b>Joe Willson</b> remembers the fatal buffer stop collision and considers the learning for today.</p>
At 08.46 on 28 February 1975, a Tube train failed to slow on the approach to Moorgate. It overran the platform, before colliding with the buffer stops and striking the end wall beyond. Forty-three people were killed, including the driver.
The first ambulances arrived at 08.54; the fire brigade followed soon after. Rescue was very difficult, and the last survivor wasn’t freed for over 13 hours.
Post-mortem evidence indicated that, at the time of impact, the driver’s hand had been on the brake handle, rather than in front of his face to protect it. Some passengers said the train speeded up when entering the station; some standing on the platform said the driver had been sitting upright and looking straight ahead. The state of the motor control gear suggested that power had been applied to the motors until within two seconds of the impact. Medical evidence said it was possible the driver had been affected by amnesia. However, the investigation report simply concluded that the accident was caused by ‘a lapse on the part of the driver’, the inspector being unable to pin down a precise reason.
Moorgate led to the introduction of ‘Moorgate Control’ (known as ‘Trains Entering Terminal Stations’ on London Underground). This was fitted in all dead-end tunnels and termini throughout the Underground system. It is the forerunner of the TPWS overspeed sensor loop, as fitted on terminal lines.
British Rail also became concerned at the possibility of a similar event happening on the national network. An early move included changing the signalling system so that a colour light signal would not show green on the approach to a terminal platform line. This effectively regarded the fixed stop light at the buffers as a signal and required a ‘caution’ aspect to be displayed at the preceding one. The display of a caution aspect in turn caused the AWS horn to be sounded if AWS was fitted. This had to be acknowledged or the train brakes would be automatically applied.
Moorgate led to the introduction of ‘Moorgate Control’, the forerunner of the TPWS overspeed sensor loop, as fitted on terminal lines.
Fast forward 49 years, and the Northern City line between Finsbury Park and Moorgate can now operate with European Train Control System (ETCS) level 2 signalling. The first train to carry passengers while operating under ETCS over the route ran on 27 November 2023. Whilst this was a major technological milestone, there’s still plenty of work to do and plenty of risks that we need to think about.
Drivers, for example, will need to be ETCS-trained and supported with the new risks that new technology brings, especially as they transition in and out of ETCS. Therefore, training days, the use of simulators, clear communication and support from management and video resources will be crucial in offering support through this transition.
Eventually, ETCS signalling will cover a 100-mile stretch of railway between London and Stoke tunnel north of Peterborough, on the East Coast Main Line from King’s Cross to Edinburgh. This provides an opportunity for operators and Network Rail to work together and learn from one another regarding the new opportunities and risks that ETCS presents.
It is important to note that ETCS requires software updates to operate trains, which takes time and is expensive to run. However, moving forward without investment in a new train protection system makes it unlikely that the SPAD rate will reduce, as people are already operating at their highest capabilities.
Therefore, the lessons of Moorgate remain important, although we should also reflect that the present ETCS signalling system operating there has the potential to pave the way for future digital signalling system across GB rail.