Overspeeding incidents pick up pace
Robust processes are needed to counter overspeeds when blanket speed restrictions are in office, say RAIB reports.
We covered the fatal overspeeding derailment at Nuneaton in 1975 in Right Track 40. It was an accident that led to the adoption of AWS to mark the start of speed restrictions in addition to its traditional use to warn drivers of red signals up ahead.
More recently, RAIB has been reporting on a number of incidents where trains have run through speed restrictions too quickly. A case in point came on 14 July 2023.
That morning, Network Rail issued 14 blanket speed restrictions (BSRs) in anticipation of heavy rainfall. Information about the BSRs was emailed to all signal boxes and operating companies that would be affected. After receiving updated weather data, Network Rail sent information about four additional BSRs at 21.45 to the same recipients. It intended them to be imposed at 04.00 on 15 July.
One of the additional BSRs applied to the section between Blackford and Gleneagles and imposed a temporary maximum permitted speed of 40 mph from 04.00 to 19.00 on 15 July. Around 05.30 that morning, the Blackford signaller saw a northbound freight pass through the restriction, apparently without reducing speed. The next two were southbound passenger services and both observed the BSR. However, the next northbound passenger appeared not to.
The Blackford signaller contacted the Auchterarder signaller to the north of the BSR to ask if the southbound trains had been stopped and cautioned about the restrictions. They hadn’t, so the Blackford signaller decided to stop the next northbound service. This was a sleeper train, whose driver said they were unaware of the BSR. The Blackford signaller provided the details before allowing the train to proceed. The signaller, now concerned that not all drivers were aware of the BSR, stopped and cautioned the next northbound service. The driver of this train was also unaware of the BSR.
RAIB found that the drivers of the first four northbound services to approach the BSR on 15 July 2023 were unaware of it because they hadn’t been provided with the necessary information when they booked on.
Network Rail issued the BSR notices using a pre-populated distribution list. The company intended that the operators would make the notices available to their drivers and for the signallers to advise drivers of the BSRs in accordance with the Rule Book.
However, due to an oversight, the notice was not forwarded to drivers booking on at Glasgow Queen Street. This meant passenger drivers taking northbound services towards Perth were not aware of the BSR between Blackford and Gleneagles.
The freight company said it did not advise its drivers as it didn’t get the email from Network Rail. The sleeper operator also said it didn’t get the mail. Network Rail did not require any acknowledgement that such notices had been received so was unaware that not all operators had received it.
Following the BSR incident between Laurencekirk and Portlethen in December 2020, Network Rail instructed route control centres that drivers should be given warnings of BSRs by signallers. In Scotland, this instruction required drivers to be stopped and cautioned for the first 12 hours after details of a BSR had been provided to drivers by their company notice process. At the time the Blackford-Gleneagles overspeedings occurred, this 12-hour period had not elapsed.
There is conflicting witness evidence as to whether local ops staff had given the signallers an explicit instruction to stop and caution trains at Blackford and Auchterarder. However, neither signaller had been stopping and cautioning trains until it became clear that northbound drivers had not been observing the BSR.
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RAIB report takeaways
RAIB note that this incident demonstrates the importance of:
having robust processes to ensure train drivers are notified of blanket speed restrictions which may affect them
signallers understanding when they are expected to stop and caution drivers on the approach to blanket speed restrictions
signallers receiving clear and unambiguous instructions when this is not required.
