The lasting influence of the Cowden collision
RSSB’s Senior Rail Operations Specialist, Tom Waghorn, considers the continuing relevance of the Cowden accident of 1994.
When I was just six, my fascination with railways began to take hold. My father and I had recently taken a trip to London from our local station, Eridge, on the Uckfield branch. I wondered why such a large station served so little in the surrounding area. At that time, the ‘preservation society’ that would become the Spa Valley Railway had set up a shop in the old Down platform waiting room. Every Sunday, we would visit to see an old heritage diesel being restored in the old bay platform.
My interest in the branch grew as I watched it transition from double track with semaphore signalling—which, as I later learned, was not in use—to single track with hardly any operational infrastructure. The aged diesel units also captured my heart. I still recall the emotions evoked by the sound of them throbbing up the bank towards Crowborough, carried on the wind to my bedroom window on summer evenings.
The weather soon changed, and the nights drew in. On 15 October 1994, the news came of a train accident on my beloved line. It seemed impossible that such a thing could happen so close to home on a sleepy backwater route, but it did. That day, two trains collided head-on near Cowden. The Up service had passed a red signal protecting the junction before running through the points onto the single line. The Down train, also on the single line, was pulling away from its station stop at Cowden, unaware of the impending collision. With no cab-to-shore radio and only the provision of a very unreliable Cellnet mobile phone—which was always switched off, anyway—there was no way to contact either driver.
Signaller Webb, on duty at Oxted, was making his breakfast when an alarm alerted him to a points indication flashing out of correspondence. The track circuits on his panel were advancing ever closer to one another. He called Control to report that an accident was imminent, placed collars on the panel to protect the indications. The inevitable collision occurred approximately 300 yards south of Cowden station and sadly took the lives of both drivers (Brian Barton and David Rees), the guard of the Up train (Jonathan Brett-Andrews), and two passengers (Ray and Maura Pointer). Due to the complex nature of the recovery of the leading vehicle of the Up train—which had been left on its side, precariously overhanging the embankment—traffic was not restored to the line until three days later.
Major C. B. Holden, HM Assistant Chief Inspecting Officer of Railways, was tasked with the investigation. Holden’s investigations revealed that human error was the primary factor in the crash, and noted that a lack of safety systems exacerbated it. Had a cab-secure radio system been available to the signaller and drivers, the collision would probably have been averted. It was also noted that while the British Rail National Radio Network was available, it did not work in the topographical conditions of the Uckfield line.
It was also noted that OD68, the signal passed at danger, was displaying adequately (but not brilliantly), which would have been affected by the foggy conditions. The signal’s placement and SPAD protection were in accordance with the standards at the time, though no trap points were provided, and the overlap of the signal was adequate to comply with the standard. An AWS was fitted on approach to this signal, but there was no other method of alerting the driver to a SPAD or stopping the train entering the single line thereafter.
Major Holden made 15 recommendations. These included solidifying the rules regarding the reporting of AWS isolation and testing prior to entry into service. His report is also one of many that considers the crashworthiness of the rolling stock in use. It doubtless had an impact on the ongoing effort to replace the Mark I stock prevalent at the time. Discussions also centred on the introduction of an automatic train protection system, leading to investigations into the use of European Train Control System (ETCS), which is now coming into wider use on GB rail.
The provision of mobile phones—which were regarded as a substitute for an adequate radio system—was unsatisfactory. Carrying one was not mandatory. There was no proper system for issuing them or for recording which trains had which phone. Their reliability was poor, and their battery endurance was low. Plus, there were black spots on the Uckfield branch where mobile phones became unusable. This recommendation led to the fitment of cab-secure radio, which was completed in December 1994.
On a broader scale, the Cowden crash was one of several pivotal events that marked a turning point for the rail industry. It underscored the necessity of continuous improvements in safety practices and highlighted the critical role of human factors in railway operations. The subsequent reforms and advancements have transformed the network into one of the safest in the world, significantly reducing the likelihood of similar tragedies.
The old units ubiquitous to the operation of the line for many decades have gone, bar a few in preservation. But the plaque on the station building at Cowden is a lasting reminder of the tragedy that occurred on that day 30 years ago.
Image credits: Cowden Railway Station, by Nick MacNeill, CC BY-SA 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons
