Lightning strikes twice at Spital
Four RAIB recommendations after an overspeed incident at Spital Junction, Peterborough.
Imagine being on a train heading up to London. You boarded at Sunderland, settled down, and all was well. It continued to be well as the diesel unit powered its way south. Then, at around 13.00, it lurched over three sets of points at Spital Junction, just outside Peterborough.
People are thrown from their seats, some injured as a result. You’re one of the luckier ones, unscathed.
RAIB’s investigation found that that the train had passed over the points at 66 mph. The maximum permitted speed over the junction is initially 30 mph, reducing to 25 mph. It also revealed that the overspeeding was caused by the driver not reacting appropriately to the signal indication they had received on the approach to the junction. This signal was indicating that the train was to take a diverging route, which had a lower speed limit than the route straight ahead. The driver expected the train to be routed straight ahead. Their application of driving awareness skills was not sufficient to overcome that expectation.
There was more to it than that, of course. Testing and analysis by RAIB also found that the junction indicator element of the signal may not have been as conspicuous as the main aspect of the signal at the point the driver saw and reacted to it.
The operator had not provided the driver with the necessary non-technical skills or additional strategies to manage the risk present at the signal. Network Rail and East Coast Main Line train operators had not effectively controlled the risk of overspeeding at the junction both at the time the signal’s operation was changed in 2013 and following a previous overspeeding incident at the same location in April 2022.
Additionally, Network Rail does not control the risk of overspeeding at locations where there is a long distance between the approach released protecting signal and the junction itself, once a proceed aspect has been given to drivers.
RAIB observed that the operator had not identified the risks associated with the signal in its route risk assessment and was not managing the development plans for the driver in accordance with its own processes. RAIB also observed that Network Rail’s reliability centred maintenance regime does not include a means to effectively manage degradation of junction indicator modules fitted with LEDs.
RAIB made four recommendations as a result of the investigation. These centre around:
training and competence management
the use of non-technical skills
sharing learning from previous incidents
making sure the standards are clear on the relative brightness of main aspects and junction indicators on signals.
RAIB has also identified two learning points for operators. The first relates to train operators ensuring that their route risk assessments include the risks to their services from signals which may show different aspects to those usually encountered. The second reminds transport undertakings of the importance of managing the competence of safety‑critical staff effectively and in accordance with their own processes.
Be aware of the need to be alert when approaching junction signals, so all the information the signal provides is acted upon.
Don’t make assumptions about the route set; just because you went one way last time, doesn’t mean you will this time.
Location of the incident and a schematic diagram of the main features on the north approach to Peterborough station. Credit: RAIB
