Modern CCS systems like the European Train Control System (ETCS) employ signalling equipment, traditionally located trackside, on trains. However, because onboard and trackside equipment is managed differently and by different organisations, information sharing can be difficult.
Defects within such CCS systems can lead to repeated instances of the same negative consequences on multiple occasions and also affect multiple implementations of the system, subsystem, equipment, or component, in different places. This is because there is no system available to detect and analyse defect data at a national level. A national CCS DRACAS would address this.
A national CCS DRACAS will increase all organisations’ ability to detect defects, faults, or failures, and help them respond effectively, wherever the defect occurred on the network. A national CCS DRACAS will also be able to analyse data from multiple organisations and data sources to find hidden trends and improvement opportunities.
RIS-0707-CCS issue two Management of Control Command and Signalling (CCS) Subsystem Failures, Faults and Defects sets out requirements for the management of failures of CCS functions that rely on the integration of a CCS onboard subsystem with a CCS trackside subsystem. It also sets out the requirements for the capabilities of the future national CCS DRACAS.
The standard details how organisations cooperate and share information about CCS subsystem failures so that risks can be managed, and actions taken to mitigate them. Conformity with the requirements in the standard supports consistency in the management of CCS subsystem failures. It also helps infrastructure managers and railway undertakings identify trends and defects, which can be precursors for future unwanted events such as failures, incidents, and accidents.
The national CCS DRACAS is expected to save the rail industry around £231m over the next ten years by alerting affected organisations to faults and failures that have been experienced in other parts of the system, whether they operate there or not.
Management of Control Command and Signalling (CCS) Subsystem Failures, Faults and Defects
A well-designed lineside signalling system is fundamental in supporting train drivers who use lineside signal aspects and indications to make good train driving decisions. The overarching goal of RIS‑0703‑CCS issue two Signalling layout and signal aspect sequence requirements is about producing a lineside signalling system that not only operates, but does so in a manner that’s both consistent and ‘driveable’. Its requirements can be used when applying the Common Safety Method for Risk Evaluation and Assessment principles to control the hazard of poor driveability.
Network Rail identified that their Signalling Design Handbook, NR/L2/SIG/19609, was, in places, out of date and that much of its valuable content already existed in RIS-0703-CCS issue one. For coherence, effectiveness, and efficiency, the most pertinent content from NR/L2/SIG/19609 was integrated into RIS-0703-CCS issue two.
The updated RIS embraces industry good practice and improves clarity and understanding. It now includes updated content on colour light junction signalling layouts and junction aspect sequences. Improved provisions for banner repeater indicators, junction indicators, and preliminary route indicators are incorporated. Subsequent feedback from consultation prompted additional changes, particularly for lamp proving controls, further simplifying arrangements, and removing unnecessary constraints. These updates offer greater flexibility in the design of junction signalling layouts, thereby enhancing driveability.
By absorbing valid content from the withdrawn Signalling Design Handbook into the RIS, Network Rail can not only reduce document maintenance but also achieve alignment with industry standards. Although the quantifiable value of this benefit is modest, the cumulative impact of these changes is significant. The resultant changes streamline processes, eliminate inefficiencies, bolster compliance, and have the potential to save the industry in the region of £1.2M over five years.
Signalling layout and signal aspect sequence requirements
Great Britain (GB) has specific cases in the Infrastructure NTSN to define the gauge clearance for the upper and lower sectors. The GB NTRs which provide these are set out in GIRT7073 issue three Requirements for the Position of Infrastructure and for Defining and Maintaining Clearances. Two published amendments against GIRT7073 issue two were reviewed and incorporated. These relate to the correct application and the use of pantograph sway values that are set out in GMRT2173 issue four Size of Vehicles and Position of Equipment, and the clearance between infrastructure and a vehicle at the vehicle’s window level.
Wind increases pantograph sway values, and hence reduces the clearance between the swept envelope / gauge of a vehicle and the infrastructure and / or swept envelope / gauge of a vehicle on an adjacent track. In addition, adequate clearance between infrastructure and a vehicle at the vehicle’s window level is required to minimise the risk of collision of infrastructure with passengers and railway staff leaning out of windows.
The updates in GIRT7073 issue three provide separate requirements, add rationale, and give guidance. Requirements have been updated to refer to the INF NTSN. Residual guidance from GEGN8573 issue four Guidance on Gauging and Platform Stepping Distance has been included. With the guidance in GEGN8573 issue four now being addressed in other standards it has been withdrawn in its entirety.
Incorporation of the published amendments provides clarification to help with the intended application of requirements and avoidance of unnecessary costs being incurred in the design of infrastructure. Providing rationale and guidance for requirements helps users understand the purpose of requirements and their application.
The standard is intended for use by individuals and organisations involved in the specification and design of new or altered infrastructure, as well as those involved in compatibility assessments.
Requirements for the Position of Infrastructure and for Defining and Maintaining Clearances
GMGN2696 issue one Assessment of Passenger Seat Comfort was published in June 2023. The guidance note was created to incorporate the outputs of RSSB Research Project T1140 Defining the requirements of a seat comfort selection process which was published in May 2019.
GMGN2696 issue one sets out the methodology and process for assessing seats in relation to passenger static comfort as established in T1140. Following industry use of the outputs of T1140, the scoring and assessment methods from the project have been modified to take the feedback into account. In response an evolved version for the assessment of passenger static seat comfort has been developed.
GMGN2696 issue one enables seats to be assessed against the target comfort score using this process. The guidance note also discusses other factors that affect the installation of seats such as interior passive safety and passengers’ perception of comfort. This helps with the trade-off between high-density, short-distance urban travel and long-distance inter-city travel that has an influence on the seat layout and target level of comfort.
The new guidance note defines a static seat comfort assessment system that allows seats to be scored consistently. The overall seat comfort score provides stakeholders with a reference figure for how comfortable the seat is and is intended to be used by TOCs, ROSCOs, vehicle interior designers, and builders.
This document can also be used by passenger satisfaction survey groups or ergonomists seeking to quantify the level of comfort for passenger seats on railways.
RSSB welcomes feedback when GMGN2696 is used.
GMGN2696 issue oneAssessment of Passenger Seat Comfort
Detonators are a Victorian safeguard, invented in the 19th century, consisting of a small explosive charge that detonates with a loud bang when crushed by a train wheel, sounding a warning. Detonators are still required in certain operational scenarios in Great Britain, despite the many advances in technology that have occurred since their introduction. The use of detonators introduces risks of its own. Apart from the hazards related to the storage, transport, and use of explosives, staff are also put at risk as they must go out on the track to place detonators where required by the Rule Book.
In September, RSSB published updated rules setting out how a failed train is assisted by another train. These rules were developed based on a detailed risk assessment which builds on the findings of RSSB research project T1155 Reviewing the risks and benefits of detonator usage. They have removed the requirement for detonators to be used as assistance protection. In many cases the driver of a failed train will no longer be required to leave that train at all, improving workforce safety by reducing the exposure of staff to trackside hazards.
Acknowledging that these new rules represent a significant change from previous arrangements, RSSB technical specialists worked with industry representatives to produce a detailed briefing package, including video ‘explainers’, to help industry implement the changes. These briefing materials received positive feedback from key stakeholders in the industry.
This is the first use case for detonators to be eliminated in Great Britain. Work continues to assess whether alternatives to detonators can be used in the other operational scenarios where they are currently required.
GERT8000-M1 issue sevenDealing with a train accident or train evacuation
GERT8000-M2 issue sevenTrain stopped by train failure
A key output for the Traffic Operations and Management standards committee this year was the publication of a new guidance note, GOGN3616 issue one Guidance on Operational Railway Safety Awareness covering guidance on operational railway safety awareness. The standard sets out the risks, hazards, and control measures to be considered in training, and provides a framework for competence assessment and review. Appendices give worked examples of how to apply the framework, using four examples of industry roles and tasks.
Historically, the industry has tended to create ‘one size fits all’ personal track safety (PTS) training for staff. PTS refers to the responsibilities and duties of workers when they are working ‘on or near the line’ on the railway infrastructure, as defined in the Rule Book.
The competency and skillset covered by a PTS course are essential for workers who perform trackside tasks. However, standard PTS courses based only on Rule Book requirements have not always included scenarios such as depots, yards, sidings, or freight terminals. Because of this, they may not have sufficiently addressed the risks associated with some operational tasks and environments. For the first time, GOGN3616 sets out a common training and competence approach for personal safety for railway undertakings and other railway actors in the industry. This promotes tailored training and competence management based on an analysis of tasks that staff are required to carry out in the course of their duties, rather than a standard approach.
Modular training material has been created for the four examples in the appendices. Industry can use these examples as templates on completion of their specific risk-based training needs analysis.
Guidance on Operational Railway Safety Awareness